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UNITED STATES v. SMITH: THE USE-POSSESSION
DEBATE IN SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
UNDER § 10(b)
Oriana N. Li
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address an underlying issue in the evolution
of insider trading law: whether Rule lOb-5 liability should attach when someone trades while
"in the possession of" material, nonpublic information, or whether a more stringent standard
of having actually used or traded "on the basis of" such information must be met. In United
States v. Smith, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a violation of Rule 1Ob-5
requires an actual causal connection between the possession of inside information and the
decision to trade in securities. This Note argues that the court erred in dismissing the knowing
possession standard in favor of adopting an actual use standard. Although a causal connection
between inside information and trading is an element of the Rule lOb-5 offense, this Note
argues that knowing possession alone sufficiently satisfies the scienter and "to use and
employ" elements of § 10(b) to establish the causal connection. The knowing possession
standard finds support in the statutory interpretation of § 10(b), analogous anti-fraud
provisions, judicial and administrative precedent, and the policy objective of achieving an
honest securities market through full disclosure of material nonpublic information.
The use-possession debate centers on whether an insider trading
conviction under § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (Exchange
Act)' and Rule lOb-5,2 promulgated thereunder, requires the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prove both that the defendant was
in knowing possession of material' nonpublic information4 and actually
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b), the central anti-fraud provision of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person... [tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Rule lob-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly... (a) To employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary... or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
3. This Note assumes the uniform standard of materiality under § 10(b) as adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, which held that a fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it as altering the total mix of information in
deciding whether to buy or sell. 485 U.S. 224,240 (1988).
4. This Note uses "material nonpublic information" and "inside information" interchangeably.
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used that information in trading, or whether possession alone suffices. A
trilogy of recent appellate decisions indicates that the circuits are split on
this issue in the context of the SEC's civil and criminal enforcement
actions against individuals.5 The majority of commentators favor an
actual use standard in determining § 10(b) liability.6 A clear resolution of
the issue is necessary to enable the SEC to carry out its enforcement
mandate and to guide attorneys in advising clients on how to refrain from
illegal trading.
This Note argues that the debate hinges on the definitions of scienter
and use because the key inquiries in choosing a standard are the level of
scienter required to establish deception under § 10(b) and what type of
use or misuse of inside information sufficiently satisfies scienter. It
further argues that the knowing possession standard satisfies the § 10(b)
deception element under any of the three culpability requirements that
encompass scienter because to establish that the defendant intended,
knew of, or was reckless in misusing inside information, the SEC need
only prove that the defendant withheld disclosure in one of these ways in
breach of a fiduciary duty. This Note concludes that gaining profits or
avoiding losses through deceptive nondisclosure and illegal acquisition
of inside information satisfies the scienter requirement and constitutes
affirmative uses that give rise to § 10(b) liability.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the use-possession debate
by examining recent circuit court decisions on the subject, including the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Smith.7 Part II argues that the
Ninth Circuit erred in applying an actual use standard and that the
knowing possession standard better comports with the language of
§ 10(b) and judicial and administrative interpretation of that language.
The application of the requirements of the common law action of deceit
in the federal securities context and the classic and misappropriation
theories of insider trading all support the knowing possession standard.
Such a standard establishes the requisite causal connection between
inside information and trading because knowing possession, as one form
5. All are issues of first impression for the respective circuits. See infra Part I.
6. See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1334 n.23 (1 th Cir. 1998) (citing 2 A. Bromberg & L.
Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 7.4(600), at 7:159, 7:160.14 (1996); 3 Arnold
S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5 § 66.02[c], at 3-657 (1981); Allan Horwich,
Possession Versus Use: Is There a Causation Element in the Prohibition on Insider Trading?, 52
Bus. Law. 1235, 1268 (1997)). But see 7 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation
3504-05 (3d ed. 1991) (concluding that "[t]he very difficulty of establishing actual use of inside
information points to possession as the test").
7. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
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of misuse of such information in breach of a fiduciary duty, is sufficient
to satisfy the scienter requirement. Part III further argues that because the
knowing possession standard honors legislative intent to achieve a fair
and honest securities market by eliminating unnecessary evidentiary
hurdles to SEC enforcement efforts, courts must defer to the SEC's
preference for the standard.
I. CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON THE USE-POSSESSION DEBATE
In United States v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit echoed the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in SEC v. Adler8 that proof of knowing possession of
insider information while trading is insufficient to impose liability under
§ 10(b). 9 The Smith and Adler courts both rejected the Second Circuit's
widely commented'0 dicta in United States v. Teicher," which suggested
that knowing possession is the better standard. This trilogy shows the
split of authority among the circuits and creates uncertainty in the
effective enforcement of insider trading regulations under § 10(b).
A. United States v. Teicher: The Knowing Possession Standard
The use-possession debate first surfaced in Teicher.2 The defendants
were arbitrageurs who had profited by trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information misappropriated by their tippers-
insiders from a law firm and a brokerage firm who had access to
confidential client information. 3 They contended on appeal that the
district court had erroneously instructed the jury that the SEC need not
8. 137 F.3d 1325.
9., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
10. See, e.g., Horwieb, supra note 6, at 1250 (recognizing that Teicher "devoted considerable
attention" to possession-use debate in its "admittedly dictum" ruling in favor of possession
standard); Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Insider Trading, Nat'l L.L, Mar. 24, 1993, at 3, 27
(concluding that by eliminating causation requirement, Teicher "may greatly increase the scope of
both criminal and civil liability for insider trading" and predicting that more criminal prosecutions
and civil litigations will "test the contours of the court's Teicher ruling"); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Actual Use of Inside Information at Issue, Nat'l L.J., June 21, 1993, at 20, 20
(observing that impact of Teicher's "broad articulation of a possession standard," albeit in dicta, will
be "felt most profoundly not in litigation but in the day-to-day efforts by market participants... to
avoid trades that, in hindsight, cross the murky line into illegality").
11. 987 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding it "unnecessary to determine whether proof of
securities fraud requires a causal connection" because there was ample evidence that defendants
used inside information).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 114-15.
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prove a causal relationship between their trading and the misappropriated
information. 4 They further contended that to establish causal connection
through actual use, the government must prove that the trade was not
conducted "on an independent and proper basis."'5 The SEC countered
that liability arises under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 when trading is
conducted in "knowing possession" of inside information "obtained in
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty."' 6 In affirming the criminal
convictions, the Second Circuit concluded that a person who traded
while possessing information known to be material, nonpublic, and
fraudulently obtained must have traded on the basis of that information. 7
Teicher enunciated three reasons why proof of knowing possession is
sufficient to sustain an insider trading prosecution.' First, both § 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5 require only that a deceptive practice be conducted "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security."' 9 This clause must be
construed flexibly.2" Second, the knowing possession standard better
comports with the principle that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to
hold material nonpublic information in confidence must either disclose
the information before trading, or abstain from trading.2' Third, as a
matter of policy and pragmatism, a knowing possession standard avoids
the evidentiary difficulty of establishing a causal connection.2"
B. SEC v. Adler: The Actual Use Standard
SEC v. Adler addressed the causal connection issue head-on.23 The
principal defendant was a corporate director who avoided losses by
selling his corporate stock upon learning of unreleased, adverse earnings
projections and accounting fraud. 4 The Eleventh Circuit provided four
14. Id. at 119.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 120 (citing Sterling Drug Inc. Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 14,675, [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 81,570, at 80,298 (Apr. 18, 1978) ("The Commission
also believes that [under] Rule 1Ob-5 .... [i]f an insider sells his securities while in possession of
material adverse non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his position to the
detriment of the public.").
17. Id. at 121.
18. Id. at 120.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981)).
21. Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980)).
22. Id. at 120-21.
23. 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
24. Id. at 1327-29.
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reasons in support of its holding that knowing possession of material
nonpublic information while trading is not a per se violation of insider
trading laws and that the defendant may present evidence to rebut any
reasonable inference of scienter.' First, the inference of use from
possession overcomes evidentiary difficulties.26 Second, the actual use
standard comports better with the language of § 10(b), Rule 1Ob-5 27 and
Supreme Court authority that has emphasized that the focus in
determining § 10(b) liability is on deception and fraud.28 Third, trading
with material nonpublic information does not "always and inevitably"
constitute a breach of the duty to disclose or abstain. 29 Lastly, Adler
declined to defer to the SEC's preference for the knowing possession
standard because the SEC had not been consistent on the issue.3"
C. Smith Follows Adler in Favor of an Actual Use Standard
In United States v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit invoked the actual use
standard to affirm a criminal insider trading conviction.3' The defendant,
Smith, was an insider who sold his corporate stock holdings upon
learning of unreleased, adverse earnings projections from conversations
with corporate officers.32 Smith contended on appeal that the district
court had erroneously instructed the jury that he could be convicted
based upon his possession, as opposed to his use, of inside information.33
The SEC countered that the jury instruction had generously exceeded the
requirements of existing law for two reasons.34 First, there is no causation
element to an insider trading prosecution.35 Second, § 10(b) liability
25. Id. at 1337.
26. Id. at 1337-38. Under the inference of use rule, the insider can produce rebuttal evidence to
show that there was no causal connection between the information and the trade. The fact-finder then
weighs all evidence to determine whether inside information was actually used. See infra Part III.B.
27. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1338.
28. Id. (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 667 n.27 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
29. Id. (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961)); id. at 1333 (citing Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 226-28) (stating that duty to disclose or abstain derives from fiduciary duty that corporate
insiders owe to corporate shareholders not to take advantage of inside information by trading without
disclosure).
30. Id. at 1339.
31. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
32. Id. at 1053.
33. Id. at 1055.
34. Id. at 1066.
35. Id.
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arises when an insider like Smith trades in his company stock while
possessing corporate information "that he knows (or is reckless in not
knowing) to be material and nonpublic," whether or not the inside
information is a factor in the decision to trade.36
In holding that Rule 1Ob-5 requires the SEC to prove actual use of
inside information in consummating a trade, the Smith court concluded
that authority better supported the Adler court's arguments in favor of the
actual use standard.37 In particular, the Smith court emphasized that
Supreme Court dicta and lower court precedent suggest that Rule 1 Ob-5
requires the SEC to prove causation in insider trading prosecutions.38 The
court concluded that a violation of Rule lOb-5 arises only when there is
"intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive," 39 and that it is the
use rather than the possession of inside information that gives rise to the
requisite intent to defraud.4"
D. Summary
Smith's criticism of Teicher's possession standard and adoption of
Adler's actual use standard further polarized the debate without weighing
the key question of whether possession of inside information is alone
sufficient proof of the scienter element of § 10(b)'s deception requirement.
Inherent in the holdings of Adler and Smith is the courts' conclusion that
proof of scienter requires both possession and actual use of inside
information when consummating a trade. By contrast, Teicher suggested
that trading while in knowing possession of fraudulently obtained inside
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1067-68 (agreeing with Adler's analysis that SEC's position on causation has
"fluctuated over time") (citing SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1336 (11 th Cir. 1998)). The Smith court
agreed with Adler that a "use" requirement is more consistent with the language of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, which emphasizes manipulation, deception, and fraud. Id. at 1068. Specifically, the Smith
court criticized the Second Circuit's focus on the phrase "in connection with" in Teicher as
misplaced because the "main thrust" of Rule lOb-5 is not just to prohibit certain acts "in connection
with" transactions in securities, but rather to prohibit the employment of "manipulative" and
"deceptive" trading practices in connection with those transactions. Id. Moreover, the Smith court
reasoned that, because Cady, Roberts's "disclose or abstain" maxim aimed to effectuate
congressional intent in enacting the Securities Exchange Act by eliminating the use of inside
information for personal advantage, the latter half of the maxim does not enjoin all trading but only
trading that is conducted on the basis of insider information. Id. at 1069 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
38. Id. at 1067-69.
39. Id. at 1068 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983)).
40. Id.
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information is sufficient to satisfy scienter and refute good faith4" by
concluding that any alleged defects in the jury instruction defining "use"
as the "equivalent of mere possession" '42 were "harmless beyond doubt."'43
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION SUPPORTS THE KNOWING
POSSESSION STANDARD
Answering the key question of whether reckless, knowing, or
intentional conduct in failing to disclose inside information in one's
possession satisfies scienter requires an analysis of the § 10(b) statutory
interpretation of "any," "in connection with," "fraud," and "to use and
employ."" Four major sources of authority on statutory interpretation
support the knowing possession standard. First, judicial and administrative
interpretation, which are almost entirely responsible for the development
of the federal law of insider trading,45 help illuminate the broad scope of
prohibitions.46 The common law action of deceit also supports a flexible
interpretation of § 10(b). Second, deceptive nondisclosure of material
nonpublic information in one's possession gives rise to fraud or
manipulation under both the classic and misappropriation theories of
insider trading. Third, inherent in the process of illegally acquiring,
misappropriating, or withholding inside information lies the requisite
scienter to defraud, defined by the federal courts and at common law to
include all three mental states. A synthesis of these first three sources of
authority refutes Smith's interpretation of Supreme Court dicta as
requiring an exclusive use of inside information to establish the causal
connection element. Lastly, the "in possession of' language and the
legislative history of an analogous anti-fraud provision explicitly
supports the knowing possession standard.
41. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. Id. at 119.
43. Id. at 121.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also supra note 1.
45. Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 10 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1982).
46. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (noting that silence in connection
with purchase or sale of securities may operate as fraud under § 10(b) despite absence of statutory
language addressing issue).
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A. The Supreme Court Has Held that § O(b) Should Be
Interpreted Flexibly
The Supreme Court has held that the anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities laws should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes."47 A very recent example
of the Court's liberal construction of § 10(b) is United States v. 0 'Hagan,
where in response to the split among the circuits regarding the validity of
the misappropriation theory,4" the Court endorsed the misappropriation
theory of liability.49 The Court reasoned that the misappropriation theory
comports with the statutory language that requires deception "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security," rather than deception of
identifiable purchasers or sellers." O'Hagan is important to the use-
possession debate because it supports the knowing standard, which
recognizes that because the multiple uses of information include its
misappropriation and nondisclosure, knowing possession is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition in giving rise to § 10(b) liability.
1. Judicial and Administrative Interpretation
The starting point of statutory construction is the statutory language
itself." Section 10(b) bans the use of any deceptive device in the purchase
or sale of any security by any person. 2 This sweeping proscription of
fraudulent and deceptive practices must be read broadly because of the
"any person" language preceding the "in connection with" phrase.53 This
open language indicates that congressional concern was not limited to
corporate insiders,' a view that finds support in the seminal administrative
47. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983) (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
48. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
49. 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997).
50. Id. at 2210; cf id. at 2225-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (refusing
to adopt dissent's narrow statutory construction of "in connection with," which would have required
SEC to prove that sole use for undisclosed misappropriated information was for directly
consummating securities transaction).
51. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also supra note 1.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting broad "touch"
test enunciated by Supreme Court where phrase "in connection with" was flexibly construed to
include deceptive practices "touching" the sale of securities).
54. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (extending § 10(b) liability to corporate "outsiders"
through misappropriation theory).
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case of Cady, Roberts, which held "any person" to mean that the class of
persons who has the duty to disclose or abstain includes "anyone" who
misuses corporate information for personal benefit." Because the
repeated use and plain meaning of the word "any" evidences legislative
intent to draft an inclusive and broad rule,56 it supports a broader
knowing possession standard.
2. Federal Courts Have Modified the Application of the Requirements
of the Common Law Action ofDeceit in the § 10(b) Context
Because the legislative history of § 10(b) sheds little light on the
individual substantive elements of an insider trading action, the common
law backdrop is particularly relevant in determining the proper interpretive
scope of the statute. 7 Many jurisdictions agree that the elements of Rule
1 Ob-5 actions involving misrepresentations or omissions generally mirror
the elements of the common law tort action of deceit, upon which the
Rule lOb-5 action is based.58  The Supreme Court has explicitly
analogized the elements of an offense under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
those of the common law of deceit,59 which consist of (1) false
representation, (2) fraudulently made, (3) with the intention of inducing
another to justifiably rely thereon, and that (4) causes damage.' However,
because Congress intended to remedy deficiencies in the common law by
enacting federal securities regulation and because the modem securities
55. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In this first government prosecution of insider
trading, the SEC established that the duty to disclose or abstain stems from both a fiduciary
relationship "giving access... to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone," as well as a result of the "inherent unfairness" of using
confidential information for personal advantage, and that tippees assume a tipper's fiduciary
obligation to shareholders to disclose or abstain from trading in the corporation's securities. Id.
at 912.
56. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
57. See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 824, 824,
828 (1965).
58. See, e.g., Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 765 F.2d 1039, 1040 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (stating
that elements of rule lOb-5 action are "(1) a misstatement or an omission; (2) of material fact; (3)
made with scienter, (4) on which the class reasonably relied; (5) which proximately caused the class'
injury"); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that lOb-5 claims require that plaintiff allege that, "in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false material representation or omitted to
disclose material information and that plaintiff's reliance on defendant's actions caused him
injury").
59. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980); id. at 239-41 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 247-48 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
60. 2 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 7.1, at 381 (2d ed. 1986) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 525 (1977)).
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markets do not resemble the face-to-face transactions typical of the
common law deceit action, courts have modified their application of the
common law to Rule lOb-5.6t
For example, the federal courts have relaxed the common law
requirements of reliance and causation, two concepts that have been used
interchangeably in the context of Rule lOb-5. 62 The Supreme Court has
ruled that, where circumstances primarily involve an omission of
material information, positive proof of reliance on the part of the plaintiff
is not necessary to establish the causal connection.63 This has removed a
"stumbling block for extending the common law duty of fiduciary
disclosure to open-market trading cases."'  However, it is important to
distinguish the concept of causation defined at common law from that
defined in SEC enforcement actions. At common law, proof of causation
is necessary for plaintiffs to recover losses suffered in reliance on an
insider's nondisclosure in private § 10(b) actions. In SEC enforcement
actions, proof of causation is necessary to show that the defendant
profited from reliance on the undisclosed information. The use-
possession debate focuses on the latter.
B. Deceptive Nondisclosure in Breach of Fiduciary Duty Constitutes
Fraud Under the Classic and the Misappropriation Theories
Deception and manipulation are key elements of a § 10(b) offense.65
Even though the courts have repeatedly stated that the anti-fraud
provisions of the Exchange Act are not limited to circumstances that
would give rise to a common law action for deceit, they have traditionally
declined to define fraud with specificity.66 Fraudulent uses of confidential
information fall within the purview of § 10(b)'s prohibition if the fraud is
61. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963) (rejecting
technical interpretation of "fraud or deceit" as requiring common law proof of intent to injure and
actual injury); Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978) (observing that "[j]udicial
development of a private right of action under [Rule 1Ob-5] has led to significant relaxation of many
of the elements of common law fraud, including privity, reliance, and the distinction between
misrepresentation and non-disclosure"); 2 Harper et al., supra note 60, § 7.13, at 464-65; infra notes
62-64, 66, 114, 115 and accompanying text.
62. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974).
63. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
64. Langevoort, supra note 45, at 18.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977);
supra note 1.
66. Loss & Seligman, supra note 6, at 3429-30.
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"in connection with" any securities transaction. The Supreme Court has
held that without a predicate breach of fiduciary duty, there can be no
underlying fraud within the meaning of § 10(b). 8 A breach of fiduciary
duty without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure,
however, does not violate § 10(b) or Rule 10b-569 because Congress did
not intend to "prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception."'7 Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that a breach of
fiduciary duty involving nondisclosure constitutes deception under
§ 10(b). While the classic insider trading theory is predicated on the
breach of fiduciary duty by the insider in failing to disclose inside
information to the shareholders of a corporation, the misappropriation
theory predicates liability "on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information."'
1. The Knowing Possession Standard Comports with the Disclose or
Abstain Premise of the Classic Insider Trading Theory
The classic theory of insider trading found its conceptual
underpinnings in Chiarella v. United States.7' In that case, the Supreme
Court held that, as a matter of statutory construction, the duty to disclose
under § 10(b) does not arise from the "mere possession" of nonpublic
information because the "catchall provision" of § 10(b) must catch fraud73
and not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes such fraud.7' The
Court relied on administrative 5 and judicial interpretations76 to conclude
67. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2209 (1997).
68. See, e.g., id. at 2207; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,231 (1980).
69. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476 (holding that unfairly low valuation price that was fully
disclosed could not amount to fraud unless disclosure was misleading). Because lOb-5 does not
cover allegations of corporate mismanagement unless the shareholder can point to inadequate
disclosure or manipulation of stock prices through deception, the court in Santa Fe Industries was
reluctant to extend lOb-5 into the province of state law regarding corporate mismanagement. Id.
at 479.
70. Id. at 473.
71. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
72. 445 U.S. 222.
73. Id, at 235.
74. Id. at 232-33 (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474-77). The Chiarella court thus rejected
the parity of information theory because that theory assumes that all unequal access to material
nonpublic information constitutes fraud. Id. at 233.
75. Id. at 226-27 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)); see also supra note 55.
76. Id. at 229 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane)
(finding violations of § 10(b) where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own
benefit); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (holding officers of
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that the duty to disclose or abstain arises from fiduciary or other
relationships of "trust and confidence." 7 Further, the Court noted that at
common law a tippee's duty to disclose or abstain arises from his "role as
a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."
78
In Dirks v. SEC, the Court held that a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty
to the corporate shareholders not to trade on inside information only
when: (1) the insider-tipper has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders not to disclose the information, and (2) the tippee knows or
has reason to know that the insider tipper had improperly disclosed the
information. 79 Although the decision turned in part on whether the
insider's purpose in making disclosure was fraudulent, the Court stressed
that in first determining whether there has been a breach of duty by the
insider, the SEC and the courts are not required to read the parties'
minds, but rather to focus on "objective criteria" such as whether the
insider received a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure
"that will translate into future earnings."8 Dirks found the tippee not
liable because he did not "misappropriate or illegally obtain" the inside
information.8 Neither he nor the tippers personally benefited from the
disclosure and thus had not breached their fiduciary duty because they
were "motivated by a desire to expose the fraud" and not monetary profit.
82
In the wake of Chiarella, the primary justification for the public
disclosure rule became the prevention of unjust enrichment. 3 Chiarella
and Dirks established that mere possession of inside information is no
longer sufficient to give rise to insider trading liability under § 10(b)
because the method of obtaining or using the information must include a
breach of a fiduciary duty.84 The focus on breach of fiduciary duty in
defining fraud supports the knowing possession standard, which
emphasizes that it is the failure to disclose this information or abstain
bank liable for inducing client corporation's shareholders to sell their stocks without nondisclosure
of material information because they served as fiduciaries to shareholders).
77. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
78. Id. at 230 n.12.
79. 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983); id. at 661 n.19 (citing Investor Management Co., 444 S.E.C. 633,
641 (1971), where SEC stated that one element of tippee liability is that tippee knew or had reason to
know that information "was nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or
otherwise").
80. Id. at 663.
81. Id. at 665.
82. Id. at 667.
83. Langevoort, supra note 45, at 19, 26.
84. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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from trading in violation of a fiduciary duty that makes insider trading
fraudulent.85 Liability arises where the defendant is unjustly enriched
after taking advantage of inside information to trade through personal
misuse of confidential corporate information. The misuse may well arise
from either failing to disclose the inside information in the classic
context or improperly acquiring such information in the tippee context.
2. Focus on Deceptive Nondisclosure Under the Misappropriation
Theory Supports the Knowing Possession Standard
The misappropriation theory, deemed complementary to the classic
theory,86 offers strong support to the less restrictive knowing possession
standard by broadening the scope of Rule lOb-5 liability to allow third-
party employers who are not defrauded purchasers or sellers to sue for
injunctive relief.87 Legislative history supports O'Hagan's endorsement
of the misappropriation theory,88 which bars trading of information that
the "wrongdoer converted to his own use" in violation of some fiduciary
duty to the rightful owner of the information.8 9 Like Chiarella,°
O'Hagan did not seek to catch "all conceivable forms of fraud involving
confidential information," but rather "fraudulent means of capitalizing on
such information through securities transactions."'" O'Hagan also found
support for the misappropriation theory from Dirks by emphasizing that
liability arises only if there was an expectation on the part of the
information source that the tippee would keep the inside information in
confidence and not illegally obtain or misappropriate it in the first place.92
Deceptive nondisclosure is essential to § 10(b) liability under the
misappropriation theory.93 For example, in O'Hagan the Court held that
85. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement & Prevention § 3.04, at
3-23 (June 1998).
86. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding employee-tippers
liable for violation of their duty to employer-investment banks and also violation of banks' duty to
clients).
88. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at 10 (1988) (stating that Committee believes that securities fraud
under misappropriation theory should be encompassed within § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
89. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212-13 (1997) (quoting Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A
General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 122
(1984)).
90. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
91. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
92. Id. at 2213 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983)).
93. Id. at 2208.
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the defendant's failure to disclose his personal trading to his employer-
a law firm representing the tender offeror-and to the tender target was
"deceptive" because the misappropriator is guilty of deceiving the
principal who reposed confidence and trust in him.94 Of importance is the
Court's emphasis that full disclosure to the information source of the
fiduciary's intent to trade would necessarily foreclose liability under the
misappropriation theory.95 This suggests that deception is essential to the
misappropriation theory.
3. Summary
In the use-possession context, fraud and deception stem from a breach
of fiduciary duty in merely failing to disclose inside information in one's
possession while trading.96 Smith's rejection of the "possession only" 97
standard was misguided because the standard is one of knowing
possession, which retains Chiarella's and Dirks's requirement of a
predicate breach of fiduciary duty as a sine qua non of disclose or abstain
liability. It is clear from Chiarella, Dirks, and O'Hagan that Rule 1Ob-5
only regulates deception and fraud in breach of a fiduciary duty.
The focus on nondisclosure as a deceptive breach of fiduciary duty
supports the knowing possession standard under both the classic and
misappropriation theories of insider trading. The application of the
knowing possession standard in the misappropriation context is not
unduly broad for two reasons. First, as a logical extension of the classic
theory, the misappropriation theory retains and extends the duty to
disclose or abstain.98 Second, the misappropriation theory is firmly
grounded in the prevention of unjust enrichment by those who gain
informational advantage through the unlawful acquisition or use of
confidential information. Therefore, both the classic and misappro-
priation theories support the knowing possession standard by requiring a
preexisting fiduciary relationship between the insider and corporate
shareholders in the classic context and between the "outsider""9 tipper
and the information source in the misappropriation context.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Langevoort, supra note 85, § 3.04, at 3-23.
97. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998).
98. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
99. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
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C. Scienter Is Critical to the Use-Possession Debate
Scienter is critical to the use-possession debate because it is an
element in proving § 10(b) deception and Rule lOb-5 fraud. The key
inquiries are what level of scienter the SEC must prove and whether
knowing possession is a type of use that satisfies scienter. The crucial
difference between the knowing possession standard and the actual use
standard is that the former finds liability under all three levels of
culpability whereas under the latter, liability presumably only arises upon
a specific finding of intent to defraud, a standard that lacks authoritative
support."° Analysis of the federal and common law precedent
conclusively supports the knowing possession standard because scienter
embraces all three mental states showing a lack of good faith. Reckless,
knowing, or intentional conduct in withholding, acquiring, or misappro-
priating inside information each constitutes a different form of
affirmative use of that information. Because these uses satisfy the
scienter requirement, knowing possession is sufficient to give rise to
insider trading liability under § 10(b).
1. Scienter Under the Knowing Possession Standard Embraces the
Three Mental States of Reckless, Knowing, and Intentional Conduct
In the federal securities context, it is well-established that liability
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in private actions and enforcement actions
requires a showing of scienter on the part of the defendant.' While the
courts have not offered a clear definition of scienter, it requires some sort
of showing of "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud." 10 2 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected negligence as sufficient for scienter. ° Hochfelder's invocation
of scienter as an element of a § 10(b) offense that excludes negligence'
left open the question of whether § 10(b) liability should include a less
100. See infra Part l.C.1.
101. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (Ist Cir. 1983) (holding that in Rule lOb-5
actions, proof of knowing conduct is sufficient to establish necessary scienter).
102. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976); see also SEC v. Fehn,
97 F.3d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that scienter is necessary element of insider trading
violation).
103. 425 U.S. at 200-01.
104. See id. at 193-94 (recognizing that in certain areas of law recklessness is form of intentional
conduct, but concluding that whether reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5 need not be addressed).
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demanding culpability standard, such as knowledge or recklessness, than
a specific intent to deceive."0 5 Following Hochfelder, commentators soon
concluded that recklessness satisfied the scienter requirement,0 6 and ten
of the twelve courts of appeals to decide the question have unanimously
reached the same conclusion. 1 7 Supreme Court and courts of appeals
decisions have also concluded that proof of knowing conduct is sufficient
to establish scienter.10
8
To the extent that the federal anti-fraud provisions are based on the
common law of fraud, the latter authority is "at least as persuasive an
advocate of a recklessness as of a strict intent standard.' 01 9 At common
law, the necessity for scienter was difficult to ascertain."l0 The term was
defined to mean everything from knowing falsity with an implication of
mens rea, through various gradations of recklessness, to negligence or
even liability without fault."' Importantly, a "watered down scienter"
105. Elaine E. Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule l0b-5: Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 218-20 (1977).
106. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 667, 673 (1991). See
generally William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal
Securities Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 121 (1997).
107. Johnson, supra note 106, at 674 n.22 (listing cases from circuits in numerical order: Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dilon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter.,
873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765
F.2d 1004, 1010 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)). For another comprehensive list of many other lower courts that
have found that Rule lOb-5 liability can be premised on recklessness, see 3 Arnold S. Jacobs,
Litigation and Practice Under Rule lob-5 § 63, at 3-321 to 3-322 (Mar. 1992).
108. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (stating that "scienter" is used
throughout this opinion, "as it was" in Hochfelder); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976) (concluding that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe "knowing or intentional conduct"); Nelson
v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (finding that Hochfelder only went so
far as to eliminate negligence as basis for liability and agreeing with other courts that have found
that Congress intended "ambit of § 10(b) to reach a broad category of behavior, including knowing
or reckless conduct"); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978) ("We are confident that
'knowing' conduct satisfies the scienter requirement.").
109. Bucklo, supra note 105, at 230; see also Page Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to
Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 583, 590 (1958) (citing Deny v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), which
stated that fraud is proved when it is shown that misrepresentation has been made knowingly or
"recklessly").
110. See, e.g., Leon Green, Deceit, 16 Va. L. Rev. 749, 750-52 (1930) (concluding that between
two extremes of actual fraud for which scienter was sine qua non, and innocent misrepresentation for
which scienter was dispensed altogether, lay wide array of different scienter formulae); Keeton,
supra note 109, at 598.
111. Loss & Seligman, supra note 6, at 3424.
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element implies inclusion of recklessness." 2 Like the common law,
scienter in the § 10(b) context encompasses states of mind that include
"intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a
device, scheme or artifice to defraud.".. In holding that reckless
nondisclosure suffices for scienter, the Seventh Circuit considered it
"highly inappropriate to construe the Rule lOb-5 remedy to be more
restrictive in substantive scope than its common law analogs." '114 The
Supreme Court has read into a federal securities provision a more liberal
alternative scienter doctrine than that used at common law by stating that
in an injunctive action, less scienter need be shown than that required in
a private action for damages. 5 Because an actual use standard requires
the strictest possible interpretation of the scienter requirement and goes
beyond the modem interpretations of the common law requirements, it is
incompatible with the Court's construction of modem federal anti-fraud
provisions in the securities field.
The knowing possession standard is able to withstand scrutiny under
any of these standards of culpability because reckless, knowing, or
intentional conduct in withholding material nonpublic information in
one's possession is sufficient to satisfy scienter or refute good faith. The
Hochfelder court's statement that because no one should be held liable
unless "he acted other than in good faith [and] § 10(b) should be
interpreted no more broadly,""' 6 failed to recognize that in the common
law of fraud, recklessness constitutes intent,"7 that good faith is a
defense to recklessness,"' and that the "quest for recklessness in a fraud
action is the search for tell-tale signs of bad faith.'' In Teicher, the jury
instruction with respect to scienter also turned on whether the defendants
acted in good faith'20 and the Second Circuit rejected such a defense
112. Bucklo, supra note 105, at 233 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Professor L. Loss's
comment on scienter as "knowledge or 'not giving a damn'").
113. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (quoting Shemtob v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971)).
114. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977).
115. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-93 (1963) (construing
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6).
116. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976); see also Langevoort, supra note 85,
§ 3.04, at 3-22 (stating that liability arises only in absence of good faith).
117. Kuehnle, supra note 106, at 180 n.284 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 526 cmt. e
(1977) (stating that recklessness is sufficient for liability for fraud)).
118. Id. at 181 (reasoning that recklessness "affirmatively is bad faith").
119. Id. at 192.
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"centered on the strategy" of the lack of scienter because it failed to find
any signs of good faith.' At the same time, the Hochfelder statement
indicates that the Court clearly equated scienter with a lack of good faith.
This is crucial in concluding that all three levels of culpability satisfy
scienter because they may all be inconsistent with good faith.'
2. Smith Incorrectly Raised the Threshold Proof of Scienter by
Limiting It to a Finding of Specific Intent to Defraud
Despite ample evidence that Hochfelder did not establish a standard of
specific intent to defraud and precedent in its own circuit,1'2 the Ninth
Circuit in Smith incorrectly raised the threshold for proof of scienter
from recklessness or knowing conduct to a finding of specific intent to
defraud. 24 Smith concurred with the Adler court in expressing the
concern that the knowing possession standard would not be strictly
limited to scenarios involving intentional fraud 25 and selectively quoted
Hochfelder by omitting the "knowing or intentional misconduct" phrase
126
from the Court's statutory interpretation of scienter. 127 The Smith court
cited to its decision in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., where it defined
scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."' 28 However, the court failed to point out that after Hollinger
acknowledged this description of scienter, it went on to affirm the
conclusion of ten other circuits that "recklessness may satisfy the
element of scienter in a civil action for damages under § 10(b) and Rule
120. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1993). The jury instruction read:
It is not a willful deceptive device in contravention of Rule lOb-5 for a person to use his
superior financial or expert analysis or his educated guesses or predictions or his past practices
or experience to determine what stocks to purchase or sell. Nor is it a deceptive device in
contravention of Rule 1Ob-5 for a person to buy or sell stocks based on rumors, gossip, stories,
or any other source consisting of unverified, unsubstantiated information ....
•.. If you decide that the defendant you are considering at all relevant times acted in good
faith, it is your duty to acquit him ....
Id.
121. Id.
122. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 868 n.4 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (observing that defendant's erroneous view of law is pardonable but it is not "good
faith" in legal sense) (internal quotations omitted).
123. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
124. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998).
125. Id. at 1068 & n.25.
126. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
127. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068 (internal quotations omitted).
128. Id. (quoting Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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10b-5."'29 Significantly, the Hollinger court expressly held that for
purposes of satisfying the scienter requirement of a securities fraud case,
the standard of recklessness requires highly unreasonable conduct that
amounts to an "extreme departure from standards of reasonable care."13
This definition of recklessness is "the kind of recklessness that is
equivalent to willfal fraud."'' Therefore, as long as the SEC were able to
prove this type of recklessness, it would have met Smith's insistence that
the SEC prove "intent to defraud."'32 That Hollinger was a civil case and
Smith a criminal prosecution does not change the conclusion that Smith,
in reliance on the civil case of Adler, unreasonably, and in manifest
disregard of precedent, limited scienter to its strictest possible interpre-
tation by requiring a specific intent to defraud.
3. Knowing Possession Is a Type of "Use" that Satisfies the Scienter
Requirement
The definition of "use of inside information for personal advantage" is
not restricted to any one type of use in reliance on that information. One
reason supporting the knowing possession test is that liability under Rule
lOb-5 may arise if insiders disseminate false information without trading
at all.' Since the enactment of § 10(b), the SEC has used its provisions
to remedy unlawful trading and tipping by persons occupying various
positions of trust and confidence who have "illegally acquired or illegally
used" inside information.' The provisions reach those who "unlawfully
possess or use" such informdtion and profit from it as well as those who
convert lawfully obtained information entrusted to them solely for
business purposes in breach of relationships of trust and confidence. 3 5
The use of disjunctives in the legislative history not only indicates that
both possession and acquisition of inside information constitute use but
also strengthens the argument that § 10(b)'s "use" is not an exclusive use
129. Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1568-69 (citing Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 736
F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1978)).
130. Id. at 1569 (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th
Cir. 1977)).
131. See Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting SEC v. Texas Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring)).
132. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
133. Loss & Seligman, supra note 6, at 3505, 3514.
134. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,2277 [hereinafter House ITSA Report].
135. Id. at 2277-78.
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in directly consummating a trade. Therefore, more than one "actual use"
can establish the causal connection requirement.
Dirks's focus on motivation in determining scienter'36 may be read to
support the knowing possession standard because the motivation of one
who trades while in possession of inside information that is known to be
material and possibly fraudulently obtained without disclosure must be
questioned. Specifically, the decision not to abstain from a trade while in
possession of such information constitutes an affirmative use of the
information. Thus construed, the "[t]o use or employ"'37 phrase covers a
wide range of possible deceptive behavior, including intentional
nondisclosure in the classic context and unauthorized disclosures to
others in the misappropriation context, which may ultimately contravene
the spirit and letter of the statute protecting market participants.
Smith rejected the SEC's position that inherent in the act of trading
while in possession of material nonpublic information lies the requisite
intent to defraud.'38 It reasoned that if an insider "merely" possesses and
does not use the information, the two parties are trading on a level
playing field because both are making decisions based on incomplete
information.139 However, Smith's rejection of the SEC's argument was
flawed because it did not point out that Teicher's dictum in support of a
broad possession standard was in the context of the misappropriation
theory of liability, premised on the trader's having wrongfully received
material nonpublic information from a tipper who had breached a
fiduciary duty to the information source. Chiarella's holding, that the
duty to disclose does not arise from "mere" possession of inside
information, 4' does not preclude equating knowing possession with use
when a fiduciary relationship exists. In the classic context, reckless,
knowing, or intentional failure to disclose while in knowing possession
of inside information satisfies scienter for which possession is not only a
necessary but also a sufficient condition. The standard is not mere
possession but knowing possession, which requires a breach of fiduciary
duty, to the information source in misappropriation cases, and to
corporate shareholders in the classic context. Thus, knowing possession
of material and undisclosed or fraudulently obtained information
136. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
138. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998).
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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necessarily creates an asymmetry in the playing field because such
deceptive misuse of information is in breach of trust and confidence. It is
this asymmetrical use that satisfies the scienter requirement of § 10(b).
4. Summary
Different manifestations of fraudulent use of inside information may
establish scienter to defraud and therefore the causal connection between
the trading and inside information. This supports the knowing possession
standard, and militates against the actual use standard, which relies on
the exclusivity of use in the direct consummation of trading.
D. Smith Misread Supreme Court Dicta as Supporting the Actual
Use Standard
The Supreme Court dicta on which Smith principally relied for its
adoption of the actual use standard"' supports the knowing possession
standard because the crux of the breach of fiduciary duty lies in trading
without disclosure of inside information. In addressing the "in connection
with" element of § 10(b), O'Hagan stated that "the fiduciary's fraud is
consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information,
but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to
purchase or sell securities."' 42 Smith cited this as strong support for the
actual use standard. 43 However, the O'Hagan passage suggests that the
real focus of the Court's inquiry is on nondisclosure as fraud or
deception. That is, if a fiduciary discloses the confidential information to
his principal, there would not be a Rule lOb-5 violation even if he used
the information in trading. The passage should be construed to support
the knowing possession standard which premises liability on deceptive
nondisclosure. Because it is the deceptive nondisclosure that gives rise to
advantage-taking in the form of a deceptive use, the passage better
supports the knowing possession standard that encompasses such uses.
While both Smith and Adler were correct in concluding that the
statutory interpretive focus is on fraud,'" they misread Supreme Court
141. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067 (citing OHagan, Dirks, and Chiarella as supporting "on the basis
of" standard that requires disclosure so as to prevent defendant's actual advantage-taking of material
nonpublic information for personal benefit).
142. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2209 (1997).
143. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067.
144. See supra notes 28, 37 and accompanying text.
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dicta from cases where there was no question that inside information was
actually used.1 45 They quoted similar passages from Chiarella, Dirks, and
O'Hagan in ruling that knowing possession may be insufficient to
establish liability for insider trading, 46 and that the Supreme Court "has
consistently suggested" that Rule 1Ob-5 requires the SEC to "prove
causation in insider trading prosecutions.' 47 However, the import of the
quoted passages offers no substantive support for an actual use standard
for two reasons. First, repeated use of the words "use" and "on the basis
of" stems from the fact that their determination was not at issue in those
three cases. The injection of "in possession of' as a necessary condition
would have been without substance in such cases where the use-
possession debate was not implicated. Second, the passages' emphasis on
advantage-taking of inside information for personal gain merely
highlights the judicial interpretation, the legislative intent, and the
administrative enforcement goals of § 10(b). It does not undermine a
knowing possession standard that seeks to reach the same goals of
preventing unjust enrichment by insiders, tippees, and misappropriators
whose trading without disclosure violates a fiduciary or similar duty to
maintain confidentiality.
E. Smith Failed to Discuss Adler's Incorrect Interpretation of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act
Smith's analysis of Adler was deficient because it failed to discuss
Adler's erroneous interpretation of the "in possession" language of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA). 148 The legislative history
of the ITSA is relevant to § 10(b) interpretation because both statutes aim
to insure the fairness and integrity of the securities markets, 49 and
because the legislative history indicates that Congress recognized the
need to bolster the SEC's enforcement arsenal. 50
145. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067; SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1334 (1 th Cir. 1998).
146. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067; Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333-34.
147. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1067; see also Adler, 137 F.3d at 1335.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a) (1994). The ITSA authorizes the SEC to seek up to treble civil penalty
from persons who violate securities laws "by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of
material, nonpublic information." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) (1934 Exchange Act); House ITSA Report, supra note 134, at 2295;
see also Investors Management Co., Inc. Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 78,163, at 80,517 (July 29, 1971) (citing preamble and § 2 of
Exchange Act).
150. Id. at 2279 (observing that in recent years SEC enforcement resources have declined as
securities markets have grown "dramatically in size and complexity").
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In rejecting Teicher's knowing possession standard, Adler found that
the ITSA does not resolve whether possession or use is the proper
standard.' However, the exchange during the House hearings shows
that Congress was fully aware of the difference between the two
standards. The drafting committee specifically declined suggestions that
liability under the legislation be limited to those who "knowingly cause"
the transaction because the legislation "is not intended to change current
law with respect to the level of awareness required of a violator" or to
"require a higher standard of proof than the 'preponderance of the
evidence' test now applicable to Commission injunctive actions."'5 In
response to congressional inquiry, the SEC Chairman unequivocally
stated that the existing law prohibits "trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information," ' and the director of the SEC Division
of Enforcement stated that scienter must be proven but the burden of
proof is "while in possession of" material nonpublic information as
opposed to trading "based on" such information."M These exchanges
reflect congressional awareness of the proof of violation standard as
"while in possession of' rather than "on the basis of' material nonpublic
information. Therefore, because the underlying offense of the proposed
legislation arises directly from § 10(b), Adler's attempt to completely
bifurcate 55 the analysis is flawed in that it failed to recognize that the
congressional choice of the "in possession of"56 language reflects its
conception of the prevailing interpretation of the underlying violation.
The legislative history of the ITSA points to the "in possession of"
language as an endorsement of a broader test for insider trading
liability.15 7 It rejects the alternative interpretation that the phrase "while
in possession of' could be "either an endorsement of the broader
standard or a refusal to choose between the two standards."'58 In spite of
151. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337.
152. House 1TSA Report, supra note 134, at 2282.
153. Id. at 2304 (statement of Hon. John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman).
154. Hearing on HR. 559 Before the House Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Protection and
Fin., Comm. on Energ and Commerce, 98th Cong. 71 (1983) (statement of John M. Fedders, Dir. of
SEC Div. of Enforcement) [hereinafter House ITSA Hearing].
155. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336-37.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a) (1994); see also supra note 148.
157. Langevoort, supra note 85, § 3.04, at 3-25.
158. See Horwich, supra note 6, at 1257 (quoting William K.S. Wang & Marc . Steinberg,
Insider Trading § 4.4.5, at 183-84 (1996)).
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advocacy for the "based on" standard, 59 the passage of the ITSA on the
heels of all the testimony shows that Congress chose not to read a
stringent causal connection element into the underlying § 10(b) offense
of insider trading. Because Congress was fully aware of the sharp debate
over which of the two standards to adopt, its retention of the "in
possession of" language supports an endorsement of the broader
knowing possession standard.
III. POLICY AND EVIDENTIARY REASONS SUPPORT THE SEC
PREFERENCE FOR THE KNOWING POSSESSION STANDARD
The SEC preference for the knowing possession standard should be
accorded deference because it is consonant with legislative intent and is
rooted in evidentiary difficulties that significantly impede enforcement.
Smith focused its analysis on use not as a necessary fact to show a breach
of duty, but as a necessary element to establish scienter by reasoning that
the investor who carries through a preexisting plan to trade after coming
into possession of material nonpublic information lacks the intent to
defraud or deceive."6 This extraordinarily high level of culpability 6'
ignores the SEC's concern that the "use" requirement will "entail
significant factual inquiries into the state of mind and the motivations" of
inside traders.'62 The inference of use rule, adopted in Adler'63 and
endorsed in Smith,"6 is insufficient to overcome the evidentiary
difficulties. Further, the rule is of little practical utility under Smith's
significant factor causation test which comports with the knowing
possession standard.
A. The Knowing Possession Standard Is Consistent with the Policy
Goals of the Federal Securities Laws
Policy and pragmatic considerations underlying § 10(b) further lend
support to the knowing possession standard. Two of the primary goals of
the federal securities laws are to maintain fair and honest securities
159. See, e.g., House 1TSA Hearing, supra note 154, at 196-97 (statement of Arnold S. Jacobs,
Chairman of New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Sec. Reg.).
160. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998).
161. See supra Parts fI.C.1-2.
162. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1069.
163. See supra note 26 and infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
164. See infra note 181.
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markets and to prevent unfair practices in these markets. 65 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly described the fundamental purpose of the Exchange
Act as implementing "a philosophy of full disclosure."'" This philosophy
accords with the common law, under which the courts have consistently
imposed on a fiduciary an affirmative duty of "utmost good faith" and
"full disclosure of all material facts."'67 Therefore, not only is trading
while in possession of inside information unfair at common law, it
undermines legislative intent to prevent unfair practices in the securities
markets. The difficulties of enforcing the anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act under a strict actual use standard that requires a finding of
specific intent to defraud thwart the legislative intent of a broad remedial
measure premised on full disclosure. Conversely, the less restrictive
knowing possession standard is consonant with legislative intent to
provide the broad scope of the antifraud provisions necessary to cover
the "infinite variety of deceptive conduct."'
68
B. Smith's Endorsement of the Inference of Use Rule Fails to Alleviate
the Onerous Evidentiary Difficulties
Smith's analysis of Teicher ignored one of the most compelling
reasons to adopt the knowing possession standard: simplicity of
evidentiary proof.69 In its administrative rulings the SEC has consistently
endorsed the knowing possession standard in part because the "on the
basis of" standard subjects evidentiary proof to "metaphysical
impossibility.' 170 Inherent difficulties associated with evidentiary proof
corroborate the SEC's fear that the actual use standard will both
complicate and handicap SEC enforcement efforts. Because of the
subjectivity of intent, circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence
suffices as proof of scienter17 However, such evidence, which may
rebut the inference of use from the possession of material nonpublic
information, will rarely be able to relieve the defendant of liability
165. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also supra note 149.
166. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977); Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
167. W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment andNondisclosure, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1936).
168. Investors Management Co., Inc. Exchange Act Release, supra note 149, at 80,522.
169. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993).
170. See William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Insider Trading: Is It Back or Did It Ever
Really Go Away?, Insights, Oct. 1995, at 2, 4-5.
171. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,390-91 n.30 (1983).
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because it is nearly impossible to rebut an inference of use once knowing
possession at the time of the trade is established. For example, the
Teicher court observed that it is impossible to determine whether a
particular piece of information was a factor in choosing from myriad
alternative courses of action, such as to trade based on the information, to
change a previously decided transaction, to continue with an original
plan in spite of the information, or to refrain from trading. 72 In keeping
with the legislative goals, the SEC's enforcement efforts should not be
impeded by unnecessary evidentiary hurdles. Allowing a defendant to
avoid liability by simply presenting an independent reason'73 for trading
will severely hamper the SEC enforcement efforts.
Ninth Circuit decisions addressing scienter have invoked the inference
of use rule in the § 10(b) context of disclosing misleading statements
where there were no implications of the use-possession debate. In In re
Apple Computer Securities Litigation (Apple),174 the Ninth Circuit held
that "credible and wholly innocent explanations" for stock sales were
sufficient to defeat any inference of bad faith or scienter, which the court
interpreted to include recklessness. 75 In short, insider trading in
suspicious amounts or at suspicious times is "probative of bad faith and
scienter."'76 However, countervailing evidence requires persuasive expla-
nations for the transactions other than reliance on inside information, and
this requirement has not been met in many cases. 77 Kaplan v. Rose
illustrates the difficulty of rebutting such an inference of use from
possession. '7 In reversing summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants' rebuttal evidence of innocent
explanations for the suspicious timing of their stock sales was
inconclusive because the sales were not consistent with earlier patterns,
172. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120-21 ("Unlike a loaded weapon which may stand ready but unused,
material information can not lay idle in the human brain.").
173. Langevoort, supra note 85, § 3.04, at 3-22.
174. 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
175. Id. at 1117 (finding that innocent explanations include pre-existing programs of periodic
divestment and need to free cash to service tax liabilities).
176. Id.
177. See Horwich, supra note 6, at 1246-50 (citing several cases including SEC v. Shapiro, 494
F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding defendant's explanation that he bought stock because it
"was fairly priced, it was cheap," unpersuasive because same market conditions had existed for some
time before purchase, and before receipt of inside information)).
178. 49 F.3d 1363, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing defendants' explanations that they did
not trade in reliance on adverse material nonpublic information from "credible and wholly innocent"
ones offered in Apple).
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in large amounts and at sensitive times.'79 Further, the contention that the
stock sale was to fund retirement plans showed motivation to inflate the
stock price.'
Because Smith acknowledged Adler's version of the inference of use
test, '' it is necessary to analyze Adler's conclusion that this test suffices
to alleviate the SEC's difficulties in proving use.' To bolster the
rebuttable inference of scienter rule, Adler cited In re Worlds of Wonder
Securities Litigation (WOW) 8 3 as concluding that:
[W]here an inference of possession of material nonpublic
information and scienter arises from sales of stock prior to financial
collapse, credible and wholly innocent explanations for the sale-
e.g., sales pursuant to a predetermined plan, because of a pressing
need to service a huge debt or sale of only a small fraction of
holdings-can rebut the inference of possession.'84
Adler's reading of WOW is flawed on two levels. First, the court in WOW
was not even able to establish an inference that the defendants had
possession of inside information when they traded and called the
plaintiff's speculation "fantastic."' 85 Second, the Adler court agreed with
the SEC that cases such as Apple are inapplicable to the use-possession
debate because the issues did not involve whether the allegedly adverse
inside information was the basis or cause of the insider trading. 6
However, WOW relied on Apple's reasoning to hold the defendants not
liable for insider trading. 7 Therefore, support for Adler's inference of
use rule is weak at best.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325,
1341 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that where inference of possession of inside information arises from
suspicious timing of sale, credible and wholly innocent explanation for said sale and timing can
rebut inference).
182. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339.
183. Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1994).
184. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d at 1427-28).
185. Worlds ofWonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d at 1427.
186. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1335 n.26 (conceding that SEC was correct in pointing out that cases such
as Apple are inapplicable to use-possession debate because they did not involve insider trading
violations, but rather actions in which insiders' trading was introduced as evidence of insiders'
failure to make timely public disclosure of adverse corporate information or as evidence that
insiders' disclosure of positive information was misrepresentation).
187. Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d at 1428 (concluding that defendants provided
sufficient "credible and wholly innocent explanations" as evidence to rebut "any inference of bad
faith").
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In addition, Adler cited Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp.,
for its proposition that "defendants' reliance on inside information ... may
be inferred from [their] possession of the information." '188 This recitation
does no more than define the rebuttable inference of use or scienter rule.
It does not show, as Smith concludes,' 89 how the rule is able to alleviate
the SEC's difficulties in proving use. In sum, Smith's endorsement of
Adler's inference of use rule as sufficient to overcome evidentiary
difficulties begs the question because the key inquiry is not the rebuttal
of scienter through proof of non-use of inside information, but rather,
whether knowing possession is a type of use that satisfies scienter so as
to render rebuttal superfluous.
C. Smith's Significant Factor Test of Causation Comports with the
Knowing Possession Standard
The defendant in Smith could just as well have been convicted under a
knowing possession standard because Smith's significant factor causation
test supports the standard. Smith used this test to uphold the jury
instruction, which provided that the government need only prove that the
inside information was a "significant factor" in the defendant's decision
to trade and not "the reason."'90 The logical conclusion is that a causal
connection can be established when evidence points to inside information
as being one significant factor in a defendant's decision to trade. Adler's
inference of use rule basically requires an insider who allegedly traded
with nonpublic information to show the absence of a causal relationship
between the information and a particular trade. However, under Smith's
"significant factor"' 9' formulation, it is almost impossible for a defendant
to successfully make a showing that there was absolutely no causal
relationship between the material nonpublic information and a particular
trade because the inside information need not be the sole or dispositive
reason for trading. Therefore, this causation test undermines the actual
use standard because its saving grace, the inference of use rule, has little
practical utility under the test. Furthermore, the significant factor test
shows that the Smith court acknowledges that there is usually more than
one reason for a decision to trade. This also undercuts the actual use
188. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1335 (citing Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
189. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).
190. Id. at 1066.
191. Id.
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standard which implicitly requires that the inside information be the
exclusive reason for the decision to trade.
D. Summary
The proper standard must balance legislative intent and the
enforcement goals of the SEC against the need to avoid casting an
unnecessarily wide net in SEC enforcement efforts. The knowing
possession standard, under which § 10(b) liability arises only when a
person trades while in possession of undisclosed information obtained or
used fraudulently in breach of a fiduciary duty, achieves that balance
with clarity and efficiency. The knowing possession standard also amply
protects the legitimate use of information acquired through "superior
experience, foresight or industry." 92 Additional support comes from the
Supreme Court's pronouncement that in determining whether the
analogous Rule 14e-3(a)'s 93 disclose or abstain requirement is reasonably
designed to prevent fraudulent acts, the Court must accord the SEC's
assessment "controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."'' " This strongly indicates that judicial
interpretation of the antifraud provisions, including § 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act, should accord great weight to SEC
interpretation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Statutory interpretation and policy considerations conclusively favor a
knowing possession standard under which reckless, knowing or
intentional breaches of fiduciary duty in failing to disclose, illegally
acquiring or misappropriating inside information establishes the causal
connection between such information and trading on its basis. The
knowing possession standard comports better with the language and
purposes of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as flexibly interpreted by the
192. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also
supra note 120.
193. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1998). Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading in securities of a tender offer
target by any person (other than the bidder) "who is in possession of material information relating to
such tender offer which information he knows or has reasons to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly" from the bidder, the target, or persons acting on behalf of either.
194. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2217-18 (1997) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); see also Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977) (concluding that Court owes Commission's judgment "more than mere
deference or weight").
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Supreme Court and the SEC. In addition, the standard is consistent with
the disclose or abstain rule and the significant factor test of causation,
and finds support under both the classic and misappropriation theories of
insider trading and in the analogous anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should have adopted the
knowing possession standard in upholding the criminal conviction in
United States v. Smith.
Because violations are frequent and enforcement difficult, the higher
evidentiary hurdle of establishing causal connection through the
exclusive use of inside information in directly consummating a trade flies
in the face of the statutory language, legislative intent, common law, and
federal precedent. The knowing possession standard would enhance SEC
enforcement efforts by significantly expanding the number of successful
prosecutions under § 10(b)'s intended broad reach. The standard will
also provide the kind of bright-line test necessary for lower courts and
counselors to render consistent decisions and advice. Therefore, the
standard should be uniformly applied to all SEC enforcement actions.
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